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Comment
United States v. O'Hagan: Improperly Incorporating
Common Law Fiduciary Obligations into § 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act
Michael J. Voves*
Dorsey & Whitney, a Minneapolis law firm, represented
Grand Metropolitan' in an acquisition of the Pillsbury Com-
pany.2 When James O'Hagan, a Dorsey & Whitney partner,
learned that Grand Metropolitan was contemplating making a
tender offer3 for Pillsbury Company's common stock, he en-
gaged in what is commonly called insider trading.4 Before the
proposed tender offer became public, O'Hagan purchased 5,000
shares of Pillsbury Company common stock and 2,500 call op-
tions.5 When Grand Metropolitan publicly announced its ten-
der offer, the price of Pillsbury Company common stock rose
from $39 per share to $60 per share.6 OHagan exercised his
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 1994,
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Grand Metropolitan is a large, diversified company based in London.
United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65
U.S.L.W. 3499, 65 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1997) (No. 96-842).
2. Id.
3. A tender offer is a public invitation, made by advertisement or press
release, to shareholders of a target corporation to sell their shares. ROBERT
W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1139 (5th ed. 1994).
The tender offeror usually obligates itself to purchase all or a specified portion
of the tendered shares if certain specified conditions, namely working control
of the target, are met. Id. The share-offering price is usually higher than the
market price, accounting for the additional control over the target corporation
the offeror will have if the tender offer succeeds. Id.
4. Insider trading is the purchasing or selling of securities while in pos-
session of information unavailable to the public. See William KS. Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets:
Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1217, 1219 n.2 (1981) (defining "inside trading" for purposes of the
article).
5. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
6. Id.
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options, sold all his shares at the new market price, and real-
ized a profit of over $4,000,000.'
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an
investigation of O'Hagan's securities transactions. It charged
O'Hagan with securities fraud under SEC Rule 14e-3,' which
makes it a fraudulent act for anyone to purchase or sell securi-
ties while possessing tender offer information unavailable to
the public.9 A jury convicted OHagan, and the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota sentenced OHagan
to forty-one months imprisonment. O'Hagan appealed."
7. Id.
8. Rule 14e-3 reads in pertinent part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence,
or has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall con-
stitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within
the meaning of § 14(e) of the [Exchange Act] for any other person who
is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such
tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person
acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer,
to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such secu-
rities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such
securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the
foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly dis-
closed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1996).
9. The SEC promulgated this rule pursuant to its authority under § 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1994). Congress added § 14 to the Exchange Act through the Williams Act of
1968. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 to 78n
(1994)). Section 14(e) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawfiul for any person to make any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer.... The [SEC] shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably de-
signed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
10. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
U1 Id. The SEC also charged O'Hagan under § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b),
and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The jury convicted O'Hagan on these
counts. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622. The Eighth Circuit, however, vacated the
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Rule 14e-3
conviction, holding that the SEC exceeded its rule-making
authority under § 14(e) when it promulgated Rule 14e-3.12
Specifically, the court reasoned that, under the Supreme
Court's holding in Chiarella v. United States," the SEC could
prohibit insider trading only where there was an accompanying
breach of fiduciary duty. 4 The court held that the SEC im-
permissibly omitted a breach of fiduciary duty element in Rule
14e-3.15
The O'Hagan decision is significant because the Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have already
upheld Rule 14e-3 over challenges to the SEC's authority to
promulgate the rule.1 6 The Supreme Court, which has not yet
addressed the validity of Rule 14e-3, will now consider the is-
sue and should restore consistency to the regulation of insider
trading and provide clearer notice to potential perpetrators of
the scope of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 insider trading liability.
This Comment critically examines the O'Hagan decision,
concluding that the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted the SEC's
powers to promulgate Rule 14e-3. Part I discusses when in-
sider trading violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), with particular emphasis on violations under
§ 10(b). Part If discusses the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
reasoning in O'Hagan. Finally, Part Ill argues that the SEC
did not exceed its authority to prohibit fraudulent conduct un-
der § 14(e) when it omitted a breach of fiduciary duty element
in Rule 14e-3. In particular, it argues that the Eighth Circuit
improperly incorporated common law fiduciary principles into
§ 14(e) fraud when it should have looked to federal policy pro-
convictions because it found that they were premised solely on the misappro-
priation theory, which it found was not a valid basis for criminal liability. Id.
For a discussion of the misappropriation theory, see infra Part I.B.
12. O2agan, 92 F.3d at 627.
13. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 625 (concluding that Supreme Court prece-
dent requires that a definition of "fraudulent" under § 14(e) include a breach
of fiduciary duty).
15. See id. at 627 (holding that, in promulgating Rule 14e-3 without a
breach of fiduciary duty element, the SEC overstepped its authority).
16. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule
14e-3 is clearly within the SEC's statutory grant of authority); SEC v. Peters,
978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 560 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (adopting the view that Congress
authorized the SEC to promulgate a rule that extends beyond the common
law), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). For a discussion of the Chestman
court's reasoning, see infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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hibiting corporate insiders from using corporate information
for self-enrichment. This approach would have been consistent
with Supreme Court and lower federal court precedent inter-
preting similar anti-fraud provisions in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Part IV proposes a new model for determining when insider
trading violates § 14(e). This model recognizes that insiders to
tender offers owe disclosure duties to target company share-
holders when they use inside tender offer information for their
own personal benefit, but owe no disclosure duties when they
use such information to benefit the corporation, such as in the
case of warehousing. It also examines whether the
"misappropriation theory" of insider trading liability has vi-
ability under § 14(e).
I. LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING UNDER FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act empower the
SEC to promulgate rules that prohibit fraudulent, manipulat-
ive, and deceptive conduct in securities transactions." Section
14(e) targets fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive conduct
in the tender offer context specifically.18 The SEC has promul-
gated two rules that prohibit insider trading, Rules 10b-519 and
14e-3.20 To stay within the statutory mandate, these rules may
prohibit insider trading only when it is fraudulent, manipulat-
17. Section 10(b) is strictly an enabling provision. It prohibits any person
from using or employing, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 14(e) expressly forbids fraudulent,
manipulative, and deceptive conduct and authorizes the SEC to promulgate
rules that prohibit such conduct. Id. § 78n(e).
18. Id. § 78n(e).
19. In 1942, pursuant to the authority granted in § 10(b), the SEC en-
acted Rule 10b-5, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
20. § 240.14e-3.
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ive, or deceptive.21  Because these terms are somewhat am-
biguous, the federal courts interpreting them have played an
important role in establishing the extent to which the Ex-
change Act prohibits insider trading.2
A. SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5: LIABILITY FOR THE
CORPORATE INSIDER
Liability for insider trading under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
derives principally from the Supreme Court's holding in Chi-
arella v. United States.23 Chiarella established that certain
persons who have access to intimate knowledge of a firm, so-
called "corporate insiders,"24 violate a fiduciary25 duty to the
21. Courts have interpreted the terms "fraudulent," "deceptive," and
"manipulative" to have the same meaning. See infra note 98 (explaining the
Supreme Court's reliance on certain principles of statutory construction in
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, 472 U.S. 1 (1985)).
22. See infra Part LA.2 (discussing evolution of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
23. 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
24. Persons traditionally recognized as corporate insiders include direc-
tors, officers, and controlling shareholders of a corporation. See F.S. Tinio,
Annotation, Who is an "Insider" Within § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 2 A.L.R. FED. 274, 278 (1969). In recent years courts have extended
the term to include all employees of a corporation who have access to mate-
rial, nonpublic information, as well as non-employees who, because of their
relationship to the corporation, have access to nonpublic information. Id.
These individuals include, for example, underwriters, accountants, lawyers, or
corporate consultants. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
25. Fiduciary obligations originated at common law. Under the common
law, afrmative disclosure of all material information is required where par-
ties to a business transaction stand in a fiduciary relationship. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977). The common law fails to provide a clear
definition of the term "fiduciary," however. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879, 881
(describing the law of fiduciary obligations as evolving from a "jurisprudence
of analogy rather than principle" and "ow[ing] much to the situation-
specificity and flexibility that were Equity's hallmarks"). Although elusive,
the fiduciary concept derives in part from common law agency and trust prin-
ciples. Agency law deals with agreements under which persons (the princi-
pals) employ others (the agents) to act on their behalf while delegating them
discretionary authority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). The
law of trusts deals with situations in which persons (the trustees) have dis-
cretionary authority over property owned by others (the beneficiaries).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). Under both doctrines, this dis-
cretionary authority gives rise to duties of loyalty and candor, one of which is
the agent/trustee's duty not to misuse confidential information. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 379-398 (1957). The federal courts have incorporated
similar fiduciary obligations into the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Charles
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding securities
broker/dealer subject to fiduciary standards), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
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firm's shareholders when they fail to disclose any material, non-
public information prior to trading in others firms' shares.26 An
insider can also breach this duty without trading by "tipping"27
an outsider who then uses the nonpublic information to trade
in the corporation's stock.2 An insider avoids breaching the
fiduciary duty by disclosing the inside information before
trading with a stockholder or by abstaining from trading alto-
gether.29  The development of the fiduciary theory of § 10(b)
insider trading liability for corporate insiders owes largely to
two factors: the unsatisfactory nature of state common law,
which afforded few substantive rights to shareholders against
insider traders, and the unsatisfactory nature of some Rule
10b-5 precedents, which imposed broad disclosure duties on
the basis of possession of inside information alone.
(1944). With respect to insider trading, however, federal courts have incorpo-
rated fiduciary obligations into the securities laws not so much on the basis of
the insider's discretionary authority, but rather on the basis of the insider's
position of access to inside information. See infra Part LI.B (arguing that the
federal courts have created quasi-fiduciary relationships under § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act that do not fit squarely within traditional common law fiduciary
principles).
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30. The Court noted that "[alpplication of a
duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have
an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not
benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information."
Id. at 230.
27. A tippee is a person who trades in shares of a corporation's stock after
receiving nonpublic information from an insider. Tinio, supra note 24, at 287.
28. Courts view tippees' obligations as arising from their roles as "partici-
pants after the fact" in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty. Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 230 n.12. In addition, an insider must intend to benefit personally
from the disclosure to the tippee in order for a court to find that the tippee is
under an obligation to disclose or to abstain from trading. See Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 662 ("[T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure."). Consequently, not only is the insider's direct
or indirect benefit necessary for a breach to occur, but an element of scienter
must be present as well. Id. at 663 n.23. The benefit requirement is not as
onerous as it may first seem, however. The Supreme Court has stated that
such benefit is not limited to pecuniary gain. Id. at 663. A benefit imputes to
an insider who tips a friend or a relative as a gift. Id. at 664. In other in-
stances, the relationship between the insider and the tippee may be such that
a court will presume a quid pro quo exists. Id.
29. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853-54 (2d Cir.
1968) (requiring that the information be disclosed in a manner that insures its
availability to the investing public). Where the transaction takes place on a
stock exchange, public disclosure through the financial news media (e.g., Dow
Jones broad tape) is necessary. Id. at 854. Where disclosure would violate
the insider's duty of confidentiality to the corporation, the insider must ab-
stain from trading altogether. Id. at 848.
[Vol. 81:10151020
INSIDER TRADING
1. The Common Law Before the Exchange Act
Before the passage of the Exchange Act, a majority of state
courts held that corporate insiders owed a fiduciary duty to the
corporate entity, but not to individual shareholders." Conse-
quently, shareholders generally had no cause of action against
insiders for insider trading unless there was an actual misrep-
resentation.31 Where insiders either actively sought and in-
duced shareholders to sell, or took steps to conceal their iden-
tities as purchasers, some courts found sufficient indicia of
fraud.32 A few jurisdictions even recognized a fiduciary rela-
tionship, particularly in the case of privately-negotiated trans-
actions.33 Overall, however, state case law offered shareholders
inadequate protection from insider traders. Where insiders
purchased their corporation's securities through a stock ex-
change, they owed no duty to disclose material information to
the sellers.34 Corporate insiders who sold stock to persons
30. See Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1125 (1950) (noting that majority of
courts adhered to a no-duty rule); R.E. Heinselman, Annotation, Duty of Offi-
cer or Director of Corporation Toward One from Whom He Purchases Stock, 84
A-L.R. 615, 616-22 (1933) (citing and discussing state cases holding that cor-
porate officers and directors sustained no fiduciary relation with individual
shareholders).
31. See Heinselman, supra note 30, at 616 (noting that neither fraud nor
unfair dealing will be inferred when an insider purchases stock from a share-
holder).
32. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 428-33 (1909) (noting that no
confidential relations exist between directors and stockholders, but finding
liability where defendant took affirmative steps to conceal his identity as pur-
chaser from shareholder); George v. Ford, 36 App. D.C. 315, 329 (D.C. Cir.
1911) (holding corporate manager liable where he induced stockholder to sell
his shares and secretly bought stock for himself); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186
N.E. 659, 660-61 (Mass. 1933) (rejecting contention that directors occupy po-
sition of fiduciary to individual shareholders but holding that, where director
personally sought a stockholder for purpose of buying shares without disclos-
ing material information, relief would be granted in "appropriate instances");
Poole v. Camden 92 S.E. 454, 457 (W. Va. 1916) (holding that, even though the
director/shareholder relationship was not strictly fiduciary in character, direc-
tors who undertook to give information particularly within their knowledge
were bound to give full and correct information in purchasing stock so as not
to mislead shareholders).
33. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234-35 (Ga. 1903) (holding that
director occupied a fiduciary position to the shareholders individually);
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531, 535 (Kan. 1932) (holding director, who ne-
gotiated with widow shareholder for the purchase of her shares, liable for
failing to act in "scrupulous trust and confidence").
34. In Goodwin, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted:
An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither
1997] 1021
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buying into the corporation owed no duty to disclose inside in-
formation to them, either.35 Given the limited availability for
relief under state law, Rule 10b-5 claims became a more prom-
ising avenue for relief in insider trading cases.
36
2. Evolution of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: From Regulating
Insider Activity to Regulating All Trading Activity and
Back Again
In the 1950s and 1960s, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 emerged as the primary means for private relief in
insider trading cases. 37  Interestingly, § 10(b) does not ex-
pressly provide for a private remedy,38 but federal courts cre-
buy nor sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation
without first seeking out the other actual ultimate party to the
transaction and disclosing to him everything which a court or jury
might later find that he then knew affecting the real or speculative
value of such shares. Business of that nature is a matter to be gov-
erned by practical rules. Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not
to be made so onerous that men of experience and ability will be de-
terred from accepting such office.
Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661. Also, in Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp.
625, 630 (D. Del. 1943), a diversity action involving Kentucky law, the court
noted:
There is another reason why I conclude there was no relationship
created here which required disclosure on the part of defendant ....
These shares were traded in on the New York Curb Exchange.
Trading there is free and open. Only firm "bids" and "offers" are rec-
ognized .... Whether a person is a good or poor trader depends in a
large measure upon information; and I can see no reason why one
trader should be required to furnish information to another trader.
Id. (footnote omitted).
35. It seems that no jurisdiction found a fiduciary relation between insid-
ers and persons buying into the corporation. See generally Heinselman, supra
note 30 (discussing cases dealing exclusively with insider purchases of stock).
Many courts reasoned that a fiduciary relationship between the insider and
the buyer did not exist until after the transaction was consummated. See,
e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (criticizing traditional rule
that directors who sold their shares were not dealing with a beneficiary, but
with one whom his purchase made a beneficiary), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951).
36. Compare Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. at 630 (dismissing
state common law action), with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457,
457-58 (D. Del. 1947) (dismissing state common law action, but sustaining
Rule 10b-5 action).
37. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 915 ("[Slince there was usually little
or no favorable case law in the state courts, plaintiffs naturally preferred the
federal forum with its rule 10b-5 precedents and state law either atrophied or
never had a chance to develop.").
38. Congress made express provisions for private actions in §§ 9(e), 16(b),
and 18(a) of the Exchange Act, but there is no express provision for a private
action under § 10(b).
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ated an implied one anyway. 9 Moreover, neither § 10(b) nor
Rule 10b-5 expressly treat mere non-disclosure of inside infor-
mation as fraudulent.40 In view of Congress's expressed intent
to promote insider disclosure of information generally,41 how-
ever, courts used § 10(b) to create a new fiduciary relationship
between insiders and their corporations' shareholders under fed-
eral law.42 Over time, both the courts and the SEC, through its
39. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) ("[Mn view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of
an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the
general law implies."); see also Speed, 71 F. Supp. at 458 (following Kardon).
40. Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to prohibit manipulative and decep-
tive conduct, but does not expressly state that the mere nondisclosure of ma-
terial information in a securities transaction is manipulative or deceptive. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Also, Rule 10b-5 on its face only prohibits omissions
that would make a statement misleading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1996).
41. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 impose
registration and prospectus requirements for new securities, registration and
report requirements for corporations, brokers, and dealers, and regulation of
exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77j (codifying §§ 5-10
of the Securities Act of 1933); id. §§ 78f-78i (codifying §§ 6-9 of the Exchange
Act of 1934); id. §§ 781, 78m, 78o, 78q (codifying §§ 12, 13, 15, 17(b) of the Ex-
change Act of 1934).
42. In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951),
the court noted the following:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corpo-
rate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the
uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to provide some
degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority
may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction .... One
of the primary purposes of the [Exchange Act] was to outlaw the use
of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders
for their own financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed
public security holders.
Id. at 829. In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), the
Third Circuit stated:
Sections 10(b) and 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act... are a part
of a statutory scheme which had as its purpose the creation of a new
federal law of management-stockholder relations .... That Act deals
with the protection of investors, primarily stock-holders. It creates
many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to the common law.
It expresses federal interest in management-stockholder relation-
ships which theretofore had been almost exclusively the concern of
the states. Section 10(b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on manage-
ment vis-h-vis the corporation and its individual shareholders.
Id. at 834; see also Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963)
(holding that the Exchange Act covered more than omissions of material facts
that would constitute badges of fraud and deceit, thus that the Act was in-
tended to create a fiduciary relationship between corporate insiders and out-
siders with whom they deal in company securities); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (rejecting defendants' contention that plaintiffs must
allege genuine fraud, as distinct from an omission, under Rule 10b-5 and
1997] 1023
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administrative rulings, extended this duty to reach insider pur-
chases on stock exchanges, 3 stock sales to non-shareholders,
tips to outsiders,45 and even purchases of stock options46 and
corporate bonds.47
Section 10(b)'s scope grew most dramatically in 1968. In
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit held several
insiders and their tippees liable under § 10(b), reasoning that
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibited all trading on inside informa-
tion.4 Even the ordinary investor who, having no inside sources
to nonpublic information, by chance came to possess such in-
stating that "[hlad Congress intended to limit this authority to regulations
proscribing common-law fraud, it would probably have said so").
43. In Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC ex-
tended the scope of Rule 10b-5 to transactions on open. exchanges, noting that
"tilt would be anomalous indeed if the protection afforded by the anti-fraud
provisions were withdrawn from transactions effected on exchanges, primary
markets for securities transactions." Id. at 914.
44. The defendants in Cady contended that their stock sales were to per-
sons who had not been shareholders of the corporation. Id. at 913 & n.21.
The SEC, however, refused to accept the purchase/sale distinction for pur-
poses of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the
view that an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship
to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members
of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to intro-
duce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the se-
curities acts.
Id. at 913-14 (footnote omitted); see also Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49
(2d Cir.) (noting "it would be a sorry distinction to allow [an insider] to use the
advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary
although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one"), cert. de-
nied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
45. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
insiders liable for divulging inside information); Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 907 (sus-
pending broker tippee for selling securities on the basis of inside information).
46. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839-43 (2d Cir.
1968) (holding insiders liable for purchasing stocks and call options with in-
side information).
47. An early SEC Rule 10b-5 injunctive action involved repurchases of
bonds by the issuer's subsidiary. SEC v. Greenfield, Litigation Release No.
333, 1946 SEC LEXIS 34 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 1946) (dismissed on stipulation con-
taining offer of rescission to bondholders). One court also held an issuer of a
bond convertible into stock liable under Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose to the
investor that the bond was pledged. Kingstone v. Oceanography Dev. Corp.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,387, at 93,348 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 11, 1978). The court noted that the duty existed despite the fact that the
plaintiff did not become a bondholder until after the sale. Id.; see also Green
v. Hamilton Intl Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 729 n4 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that
holders of convertible bonds were part of "community of interest" in corpora-
tion and owed fiduciary duties).
48. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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formation, had to either publicly disclose the information or
abstain from trading altogether.49 The Texas Gulf court read
the Exchange Act broadly to promote "equal access to informa-
tion," rather than to regulate the behavior of insiders specifi-
cally.5
0
The SEC later used the Texas Gulf equal-access doctrine to
bring § 10(b) charges in nontraditional insider trading
cases.51 This prompted the Supreme Court's decision in Chi-
arella v. United States.52 The Court observed that "not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activ-
ity under § 10(b)."53 The Court found no evidence in the lan-
guage or legislative history of § 10(b) suggesting a general duty
to disclose for every market participant who possessed non-
public information.54 Instead, the Court held that liability un-
der § 10(b) arose only from a fiduciary or similar relationship of
trust between the transactional parties.55
49. Id.
50. Id. The court reasoned:
[Tihe Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the se-
curities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information .... The
essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in
the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or indirectly, to in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not take "advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing," i.e., the investing public.
Id. (quoting Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912).
51. In United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), the SEC
charged an employee of a financial printing company with a 10b-5 violation.
The financial printing company was engaged by certain corporations to print
corporate takeover bids. Id. at 1363. The defendant deduced the names of
the target companies from information contained in the documents, subse-
quently purchased stock in the target companies, and then immediately sold
the stock after the takeover attempts were made public. Id. A jury convicted
him, and the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that "[a]nyone
corporate insider or not who regularly receives material nonpublic informa-
tion may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an
affimative duty to disclose." Id. at 1365 (emphasis in original).
52. 445 U.S. 222,233 (1980).
53. Id. at 232 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
474-77 (1977)).
54. Id. at 233. Such a general duty, the Court concluded, would impose
liability "more broadly than [the Exchange Act's] language and the statutory





While rejecting the equal access theory, Chiarella vali-
dated the insider-shareholder fiduciary relationship estab-
lished in prior § 10(b) administrative and judicial proceed-
ings. 6 The Court noted that the SEC and the lower federal
courts recognized a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween shareholders and insiders of the same corporation in or-
der to prevent insiders from taking unfair advantage of the
shareholders.5 With respect to insider sales, the Court af-
firmed precedent holding insiders also stood in a fiduciary po-
sition to persons buying into the corporation. 8 Additionally,
the Court held "tippees" could be liable as "participants after
the fact" in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty. 9 In Dirks v.
SEC,6 0 the Court introduced scienter and personal benefit ele-
ments for tipper/tippee liability. 1
B. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY UNDER § 10(b) AND RULE
10b-5
An additional basis for insider trading liability arises un-
der § 10(b) as a result of questions left open in Chiarella. Chi-
arella based liability specifically on a corporate insider's si-
lence as a breach of a fiduciary duty to a buyer or seller of
securities. 2 The language in § 10(b), however, does not state
that a breach must be to the purchaser or seller.63 It states the
fraud must occur "in connection with" a securities transac-
tion.' The Chiarella Court did not address whether an indi-
vidual could commit fraud in connection with a securities
transaction by breaching a fiduciary duty to someone other
than the buyer or seller.
To illustrate, when the defendant in Chiarella purchased
securities on inside information, he did not commit fraud upon
the seller of the securities because he owed the seller no duty
56. Id.
57. Id. at 228-29. The Court placed primary emphasis on the SEC's Cady
ruling. Id.
58. Id. at 227 n.8; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 10(b) precedent that abandoned common law purchaselsale distinction).
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
60. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
61. See supra note 28 (discussing § 10(b) scienter and personal benefit
elements).
62. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).




to disclose.65 The defendant was not an insider to the issuer of
the traded securities. 66 Rather, he was an employee of a fi-
nancial printing company, and he obtained nonpublic informa-
tion relating to other companies by stealing it from the print-
ing company.' The government argued, however, that the
defendant breached a fiduciary duty to his employer when he
stole information that was properly usable for a corporate pur-
pose only.68 By misappropriating nonpublic information and
subsequently trading in securities, the government argued the
fraud was sufficiently "in connection with" the securities
transaction to support a § 10(b) criminal conviction.69
This theory of liability is commonly called the "misapprop-
riation theory."70 The victim of the fraud is the owner of the
inside information, which in Chiarella was the financial
printing company.7' The Chiarella Court declined to address
the validity of this argument since the government did not
submit it to the jury.72 After Chiarella, three federal circuits
upheld Rule 10b-5 convictions under the misappropriation the-
ory. 7  The O'Hagan court and the Fourth Circuit rejected the
theory, however, reasoning that the misappropriation of inside
information is not sufficiently "in connection with" the securi-
ties transaction to fall within § 10(b)'s coverage.7 4
65. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 224.
68. Id. at 235.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DoOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW
803 (1995) (discussing the misappropriation theory).
71. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
72. Id. at 236. In a later case, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
(1987), the Supreme Court divided evenly on the validity of the misappro-
priation theory and declined to issue an opinion on the matter. Id. at 24.
73. SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453
(9th Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit arguably accepted the validity of the mis-
appropriation theory in Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir.
1985). Usually, the source of the information is the trader's employer. See,
e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding copy-holder
breached duty to his printing company); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding investment banker breached duty to his firm).
However, federal courts have applied this theory in other contexts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion
to dismiss indictment of psychiatrist who traded on the basis of information
obtained from patient in breach of duty arising from relationship of trust and
confidence).
74. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615-22 (8th Cir. 1996),
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C. SECTION 14(e) AND RULE 14e-3: INSIDER TRADING IN
CONNECTION WITH A TENDER OFFER
Another context for insider trading liability involves the
tender offer. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, which was
added by Congress as part of the Williams Act of 1968, 5 is a
general anti-fraud provision modeled in part after § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 76  It prohibits any person from engaging in "any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts" in connection with
a tender offer.77 In 1970, Congress added an enabling provi-
sion that sets forth the SEC's powers to "define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."78 The SEC en-
acted Rule 14e-3 under this provision in 1980.71 Rule 14e-3
deems it a fraudulent act for anyone to purchase or sell stock
in the target of the tender offer while in possession of nonpub-
lic information relating to the tender offer.8"
cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3499, 65 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1997) (No.
96-842); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 948-51 (4th Cir. 1995).
75. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 to 78n
(1994)). The Williams Act added to the Exchange Act provisions that placed
certain registration and disclosure requirements upon persons planning a
tender offer or other significant acquisition of publicly held securities. Id. For
example, §§ 13(d) and 14(d) require those who acquire at least five percent of
the target company's stock to file a statement with the Commission disclosing
information such as the purchaser's background and identity, the source of
the funds to be used in making the purchase, the extent of the purchaser's
holdings in the target company, and the purpose of the purchase such as to
acquire control of, liquidate, or merge the target company. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)
(1994). Section 14(e) authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules to require
disclosure of information that it deems to be material to a determination of
whether stock should be tendered. Id. § 78n(e). Section 14(f) also requires
tender offerors to make certain disclosure requirements if they intend to
choose new directors for the target companies. Id. § 78n(f).
76. Sections 10(b) and 14(e) are textually similar, with the most signifi-
cant differences being the addition of the term "fraudulent" and the reference
to "acts" rather than "devices" in § 14(e). Compare id. § 78j(b), with id. § 78n(e).
In addition, § 14(e) contains similar language to Rule 10b-5 expressly forbid-
ding persons from making false or misleading statements or from engaging in
fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Compare id. § 78n(e), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1996).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
78. Id.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3. The SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 in Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-6239, 34-17120, IC-11336, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (1980).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3. The SEC recognized that, in the case where an
insider of the target company obtains tender offer information from the target
company and trades on that information, liability under Rule 14e-3 may
overlap with Rule 10b-5. Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6239,
34-17120, IC-11336, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410-413 (1980).
1028 [Vol. 81:1015
INSIDER TRADING
1. The Controversy Surrounding Rule 14e-3
Under the Texas Gulf equal-access rule, any person who
trades on inside information falls under the reach of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.81 Under Chiarella, however, insider trading is
only fraudulent within the meaning of § 10(b) where corporate
insiders breach a fiduciary or similar duty to the purchaser or
seller of the securities.82 When insiders trade on the basis of
inside information relating to a tender offer, they often trade
not in the securities of their own corporations, but in the secu-
rities of the tender offer target. Unless the misappropriation
theory applies, most insider trading in connection with a ten-
der offer is not fraudulent under § 10(b) because insiders of
tender offer bidders often have no fiduciary or other similar
relationship with the target company's shareholders.
83
As corporate takeovers became more frequent in the 1960s
and 1970s,84 more insider trading cases involved trading on in-
formation about possible tender offer bids.8" In light of Chi-
arella, the SEC opted not to prohibit insider trading in this
area under an expanded reading of § 10(b). 86 Instead, it en-
acted Rule 14e-3 pursuant to its authority under § 14(e). In
contrast to Rule 10b-5, which imposes disclose-or-abstain obli-
gations where there is a fiduciary or other similar relationship,
Rule 14e-3 imposes a duty to disclose or abstain on all traders
who possess inside tender offer information.88 Unsurprisingly,
Rule 14e-3 has been challenged as an impermissible extension
of SEC authority to prescribe fraudulent conduct under § 14(e).89
81. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing Texas Gulf).
82. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).
83. See, e.g., Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d
Cir. 1980) (dismissing complaint alleging that advisor to tender offeror owed
fiduciary duties to target corporation); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 &2d 1050,
1056 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that tender offeror owed no fiduciary duties to
target).
84. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 1141-51 (discussing increase in take-
over movement).
85. Id. at 1040 (discussing insider trading cases).
86. See SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. DOC. No. 92-64, at
xxxii (1971) (recognizing the Rule 10b-5 fiduciary requirement as problematic
in the context of tender offers).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1996).
89. See supra note 16 (discussing Maio, Peters, and Chestman).
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Defendants in Rule 14e-3 cases contend that § 14(e) fraud re-
quires a breach of fiduciary duty element. °
2. Cases Interpreting the Validity of Rule 14e-3
In United States v. Chestman,91 the Second Circuit upheld
the validity of Rule 14e-3 as an extension of common law fraud.92
The court reasoned that Chiarella had limited precedential
value because the enabling provision of § 14(e) represented a
broader delegation of rule-making authority than § 10(b).93
Specifically, the court noted that the statute directed the SEC
to "define" fraudulent practices and thereby empowered the
SEC to set forth the meaning of "fraudulent" itself.94 The court
also upheld the rule under the SEC's authority to "prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent" fraud.95  It reasoned
that this provision authorized the SEC to prohibit all insider
trading in the area of tender offers, even if nonfraudulent, to
handle the "difficult task of ferreting out and proving fraud."96
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the validity of Rule
14e-3, but it has examined § 14(e). In Schreiber v. Burlington
90. See supra note 16 (discussing Maio, Peters, and Chestman).
91. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
92. Id. at 560.
93. Id. at 558, 560-61.
94. Id. at 558.
95. Id. Two other circuits followed the Second Circuit's reasoning. See
SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 14e-3 was
"clearly within the SEC's .. .authority to 'prescribe means reasonably de-
signed to prevent [fraud]'"); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.
1992) (upholding Rule 14e-3 as a valid exercise of SEC's "broad prophylactic
power to 'define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent [fraud]'").
96. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 559. Where insiders tip outsiders, parties al-
leging § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations have the burden of proving that the
insiders intended to benefit personally from their tips. See supra note 28
(discussing § 10(b) scienter and benefit requirements); see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976) (requiring element of scienter in §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations). Some courts have maintained that the scien-
ter requirement is particularly onerous in the context of a tender offer. For
example, in Peters, the Court stated:
In the context of a tender offer, there is a fairly wide circle of people
with confidential information who may lack a long-term loyalty to the
issuer and who may be tempted to take advantage of the very large
short-term profits potentially available through insider trading just
prior to the announcement of the tender offer .... [It is] almost im-
possible to prove that the trader obtained such information in breach
of a fiduciary duty owed either by the trader or by the ultimate in-
sider source of the information.
Peters, 978 F.2d at 1167.
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Northern, Inc.,97 the Court acknowledged the SEC's power un-
der § 14(e) to prescribe broad regulations, but remarked that
such regulations must not change the statutory meaning of
"fraud" itself.9 The Court also indicated that it would construe
§ 14(e)'s terms in a manner similar to those in § 10(b) unless
they served a different purpose. 99 Commentators who argue
that the fiduciary element and state common law fiduciary
principles are the principal focus of § 10(b) insider trading li-
ability often read Schreiber as requiring application of common
law fiduciary principles under § 14(e).1°
97. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
98. Id. at 11 n~l. In Schreiber, the plaintiff, a shareholder of a target
company, claimed that the defendant's withdrawal of a tender offer coupled
with the substitution of a later tender offer was a "manipulative" distortion of
the market for the target's stock in violation of § 14(e). Id. at 4. The Court
rejected the plaintiffs claim, holding that an act was not manipulative within
the meaning of § 14(e) unless there was an accompanying misrepresentation
or nondisclosure. Id. at 12. In discussing § 14(e)'s enabling provision, the
court noted, "[This provision] gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
latitude to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed' means
of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in the mean-
ing of the term 'manipulative' itself." Id. at 11 m11. Although the Court dealt
specifically with the term "manipulative," its reasoning is likewise applicable
to "fraudulent," since no § 10(b) or § 14(e) cases make a material distinction
between the terms "manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent." See id. at 8. "[It
is a Tamiliar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list
should be given related meaning .... All three species of misconduct, i.e.,
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, listed by Congress are directed at fail-
ures to disclose.'" Id. (quoting Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Gover-
nors, 468 U.S. 207, 218 (1984)); see also DOOLEY, supra note 70, at 813 (noting
that dozens of Rule 10b-5 decisions have obliterated any practical differences
in the meanings of the terms).
Schreiber, therefore, injects some uncertainty into the validity of Chest-
man. The Chestman court acknowledged footnote 11 in the Schreiber opinion,
but stated that "[wihatever may be gleaned from the footnote on the SEC's
definitional authority under § 14(e), the footnote plainly endorses the SEC's
authority to draft prophylactic rules under § 14(e)." Chestman, 947 F.2d at
563.
99. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 8-12. The Court noted that Congress directed
both §§ 10(b) and 14(e) at a policy to facilitate disclosure of information,
rather than to assure the substantive fairness of tender offers. Id. The Court
held that it would not find an act manipulative when nondisclosures were not
involved; otherwise, it would be deviating from its own interpretation of § 10(b)
manipulative acts and a "congressional concern with disclosure which is the
core of the Act." Id. at 8. The Court also discussed textual similarities be-
tween §§ 10(b) and 14(e) and noted that the differences in § 14(e) did not bear
on the meanings to be given to the terms. Id. at 10-11 n.10.
100. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary
Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1189, 1196 (1995) ("In light of the well-established fiduciary duty requirement
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H. UNITED STATES V. O'HAGAN
In United States v. O'Hagan,'01 defendant James O'Hagan
challenged the validity of Rule 14e-3 as a permissible exercise
of the SEC's § 14(e) rule-making authority.1"2 He argued that
Rule 14e-3 impermissibly redefined fraud in § 14(e) by omitting
a fiduciary duty requirement. 0 3 The Eighth Circuit agreed
and vacated O'Hagan's conviction. 1°4
In defense of Rule 14e-3, the SEC pointed to the enabling
provision of § 14(e) granting the SEC authority to "define"
fraudulent acts and practices. 1 5 The SEC contended that this
provision authorized it to define all insider trading on tender
offer information as fraudulent within the meaning of § 14(e),
even if no breach of fiduciary duty was present.106 The Eighth
Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the plain language
of the statute merely permitted the SEC to identify and regu-
late acts and practices that met the statutory meaning of § 14(e)
fraud, not to define fraud itself.10 7
The court then addressed whether Rule 14e-3's lack of a fi-
duciary breach element impermissibly changed the statutory
meaning of § 14(e) fraud.108 The court remarked that, in inter-
preting the provisions of § 14(e), the Schreiber Court turned to
§ 10(b) for guidance.0 9 Accordingly, it used the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 10(b) fraud from Chiarella.11 The court
found it significant that the Chiarella Court drew upon com-
mon law concepts to define § 10(b) fraud,"' and it used that
fact to conclude that the duty under § 10(b) had to arise out of
under Rule 10b-5, however, [Rule 14e-3] may run afoul of Schreiber v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc.").
101. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3499, 65
U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1997) (No. 96-842).
102. Id. at 623.
103. Id. at 623-24.
104. Id. at 627.
105. Id. at 624.
106. Id. at 624-25.
107. "[Tlhe enabling provisions simply permit the SEC to 'define' and
'prescribe' 'acts and practices' which meet § 14(e)'s meaning of 'fraudulent.'" Id.
108. Id. at 625.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111 Id. The court observed that the Chiarella Court quoted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which states that failure to disclose in a business




a common law fiduciary or other similar obligation.1 12 Because
§ 10(b) and § 14(e) were part of the same statutory scheme, the
court concluded that § 14(e) contained the same common law
fiduciary requirement.113
The SEC then argued that the statutory meaning of § 14(e)
fraud was irrelevant because § 14(e) authorized it to prohibit
all insider trading in the tender offer context, even if non-
fraudulent, as a "means reasonably designed to prevent"
fraud.' 14 The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument too. The
court acknowledged the SEC's authority to regulate certain
activities in order to prevent the commission of fraud, but it
noted that, consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in
Schreiber, such regulations could not, in effect, change the
statutory meaning of the term.'15 Because Rule 14e-3 lacked a
breach of fiduciary duty requirement, the court concluded that
the SEC exceeded its authority by promulgating the rule.116
Ill. POLICY TAKES PRECEDENT OVER COMMON LAW
FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING § 10(b) AND § 14(e) INSIDER
TRADING LIABILITY
O'Hagan presents two distinct but related questions involv-
ing the SEC's authority to prohibit fraudulent conduct in the
tender offer context. First, O'Hagan questions whether the Ex-
change Act's enabling provision in § 14(e) grants the SEC gen-
eral authority to define what conduct constitutes fraud in § 14(e)
or whether the term has an independent statutory meaning.
Second, assuming that § 14(e) fraud has an independent statu-
tory meaning, O'Hagan queries whether a breach of a common
law fiduciary duty is a necessary component of § 14(e) insider
trading fraud.
The O'Hagan court correctly held that the enabling provi-
sion in § 14(e) does not delegate complete authority to the SEC
to define the meaning of § 14(e) fraud. 17 The court incorrectly
112. Id.
113. Id. The court found it inexplicable why the Restatement (Second) of
Torts should have force in § 10(b) but not in § 14(e). Id. at 626.
114. Id. at 627.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text (discussing SEC
authority to define § 14(e) fraud and prohibit nonfraudulent acts as a means
to prevent § 14(e) fraud).
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defined § 14(e) fraud, however, by reading common law fraud
concepts into § 14(e). 18 Instead, the court should have chosen
a meaning that best carried out the statute's overriding pur-
pose. This approach would have been consistent with what the
Supreme Court did in Chiarella1 9 and Dirks.1
20
A. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE SEC DID
NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE § 14(e) FRAUD NOR TO
REGULATE NONFRAUDULENT ACTS IN THE TENDER
OFFER CONTEXT
In O'Hagan, the SEC argued that § 14(e)'s enabling provi-
sion empowered it to define fraudulent conduct for § 14(e) pur-
poses. 121 The SEC argued in the alternative that, even if it
could not define § 14(e) fraud, § 14(e) empowered it to prohibit
nonfraudulent acts as a "means reasonably designed to pre-
vent" fraud.122 The O'Hagan court rejected both arguments on
the ground that they would, in effect, impermissibly give the
SEC authority to change the statutory meaning of § 14(e).123
This holding is an express rejection of the Second Circuit's rea-
soning in Chestman.24 Chestman held that the enabling pro-
vision did authorize the SEC to define fraudulent conduct, or in
the alternative, to prohibit nonfraudulent acts as a means to
prevent fraud.'25
The O'Hagan court's reasoning is more persuasive. Inter-
preting § 14(e) to allow the SEC to either define § 14(e) fraud
118. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text (noting the court's
use of Chiarella to interpret § 14(e)).
119. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella
and the requirement of a fiduciary relationship for liability).
120. See supra notes 28 & 61 and accompanying text (discussing Dirks and
the scienter requirement).
121. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text (addressing SEC
authority to define § 14(e) fraud).
122. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing SEC authority
to prohibit nonfraudulent acts as a means to prevent § 14(e) fraud).
123. See supra notes 107 & 115 and accompanying text (noting O'Hagan
court's reasoning).
124. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (explaining the Chest-
man holding and reasoning).
125. Chestman v. United States, 947 F.2d 551, 558-59 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc). The Chestman court reasoned that, if § 14(e) limited the SEC to pro-
hibiting insider trading only when there was a breach of fiduciary duty, the
SEC would rarely catch fraud because of the difficulty in proving such a
breach of fiduciary duty. See supra note 96 and accompanying text
(discussing Chestman's and other courts' reasoning).
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itself or prohibit insider trading in the absence of fraud in-
fringes on the independent statutory meaning of § 14(e)'s anti-
fraud provisions, and thus conflicts directly with the Supreme
Court's holding in Schreiber.'26 The Schreiber Court held that
§ 14(e)'s enabling provision provided the SEC with broad
authority to prohibit fraud, but rejected the SEC's argument
that it could prohibit nonfraudulent acts in a manner that
would effectively change the statutory meaning of § 14(e)
fraud. 2 7 Reading § 14(e) to allow the SEC to define § 14(e)
fraud, moreover, would allow the SEC to place a duty on all
market participants to disclose inside tender offer information
before trading on the basis of such information. 128 Yet, the
Chiarella Court rejected such a broad duty under § 10(b), 129
and Schreiber indicates that courts should look to § 10(b) to in-
terpret § 14(e)'s terms unless it is apparent that the terms
serve a different purpose than their § 10(b) counterparts. 130
There is little evidence that § 14(e) serves a purpose to
regulate the mere possession of tender offer information. The
Exchange Act, as amended by the addition of §§ 13 and 14 in
1968 (the Williams Act), subjects tender offers to the regula-
tory supervision of the SEC.'31 Congress narrowly tailored the
Williams Act's provisions to regulate disclosure of information
between persons making tender offers and target companies. 32
126. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing Schreiber).
127. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (explaining the Schrei-
ber holding).
128. This is, of course, what the liberal language of Rule 14e-3 accom-
plishes. Rule 14e-3 on its face forbids any person in possession of tender offer
information from trading on the basis of that information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(1996).
129. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).
As the Chiarella Court stated, 'Formulation of such a broad duty... should
not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent."
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 283 (1980).
130. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Schreiber and
its interpretation of the § 14(e) term "manipulative").
131. See supra note 75 (noting SEC regulation under the Williams Act's
provisions).
132. The Williams Ace's provisions impose specific registration and disclo-
sure requirements only on those planning to make a tender offer or other
significant acquisition of publicly traded securities. See supra note 75
(discussing Williams Act's provisions); see also H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) ("Proposed subsection (e) would... affirm the fact
that persons engaged in the making or opposing tender offers or otherwise
seeking to influence the decision of investors or the outcome of the tender of-
fer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material information to
those with whom they deal.").
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These provisions do not regulate all market participants, nor
do they deal with insider trading generally.133 Even reading
the Williams Act broadly as a statutory scheme designed to
prohibit insider trading, it at most evidences a policy specifi-
cally aimed at curbing misuse of information by insiders in-
volved in tender offers. Thus, the SEC's and Chestman's § 14(e)
interpretations impermissibly stretch the Williams Act to cover
more than just insider misconduct by redefining § 14(e) to
regulate all market participants in possession of inside tender
offer information.
B. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT MISINTERPRETED THE MEANING OF
§ 10(b) AND § 14(e) FRAUD
Once the Eighth Circuit concluded that the SEC did not
have the authority to define § 14(e) fraud, it attempted to as-
certain Congress's intended meaning of the term.134 In doing
so, the O'Hagan court misread Chiarella as mandating an in-
terpretation of § 14(e) fraud drawing heavily on common law
fiduciary principles. 13 The § 10(b) fiduciary element, as devel-
oped by the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is not the
straight-forward adoption of common law fiduciary principles
that the O'Hagan court found it to be. To the extent § 10(b)
precedents have absorbed common law fiduciary concepts into
§ 10(b) fraud, they did so not because these concepts were the
necessary source of law, but because they were consistent with
a broader federal policy aimed at preventing insiders from us-
ing inside information for self-enrichment. The importance of
this policy, rather than the common law principles O'Hagan
embraced, is evident in at least three related contexts: § 10(b)
precedent that formed the basis for the Chiarella holding, the
Dirks holding, and post-Chiarella and Dirks § 10(b) cases.
1. Pre-Chiarella cases and Chiarella v. United States: The
Fiduciary Element in § 10(b) Fraud
Although the Chiarella Court added a fiduciary element to
§ 10(b) fraud and discussed common law fiduciary principles
generally,136 the Court did not simply incorporate state com-
133. See supra note 75 (identifying Williams Act's provisions).
134. See supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text (explaining the
O'Hagan court's attempt to ascertain the meaning of § 14(e) fraud).
135. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text (addressing the coures
use of Chiarella and common law fiduciary principles to interpret § 14(e)).
136. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980). Referring to the
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mon law fiduciary principles into § 10(b) fraud. Rather, Chi-
arella based its holding on § 10(b) precedent.1 37 The insider-
shareholder relationship commonly recognized today as part of
§ 10(b) fraud is traceable to these early § 10(b) decisions, not
the common law. 38 While a few state courts recognized an in-
sider-shareholder fiduciary relationship, 139 the overall lack of
favorable case law in the state courts, 140 combined with federal
courts' unwillingness to dismiss Rule 10b-5 insider trading ac-
tions, resulted in a federal expansion of conventional common
law fiduciary obligations that eventually engulfed common law
actions altogether.' 41
Early § 10(b) decisions only recognized fiduciary obliga-
tions for insider purchases of stock in private transactions,
142
general common law rule that affirmative disclosure is required where a fi-
duciary relationship exists, the Court noted that "[federal courts] have em-
phasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that '[tihe party charged
with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it.'" Id. (second alteration in original).
137. The Chiarella Court principally relied on the SEC's Cady ruling, but
also cited Speed v. Transamerica Corp., Kohler v. Kohler, and Texas Gulf
(discussed supra in notes 42-50 & 48-50) as the basis for its holding. Chi-
arella, 445 U.S. at 226-29, 229 n.11.
138. See supra notes 42-47 (discussing SEC and circuit court decisions re-
garding § 10(b) from the mid-1940s to the late 1960s).
139. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (identifying minority rule
cases recognizing this fiduciary relationship). Perhaps hastened by federal
Rule 10b-5 decisions, the common law under the states over time has shifted,
if not to the old minority rule, at least to a more liberal rule imposing fiduci-
ary obligations on insiders. See PA. Agabin, Annotation, Duty and Liability
of Closely Held Corporation, Its Directors, Officers, or Majority Stockholders,
in Acquiring Stock of Minority Shareholder, 7 A.L.R.3d 500, 507-11 (1966 &
Supp. 1996) (discussing cases requiring disclosure of information in securities
transactions). A significant number of states, however, still adhere to the old
majority rule or find liability upon a showing that "special facts" exist. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 680 (D. Md. 1975) (holding that,
under Maryland law stockholders, directors, and officers of corporations did
not stand in confidential and fiduciary relationship to minority stockholders);
Hardy v. South Bend Sash & Door Co., 603 N.E.2d 895, 900 (Ind. App. 1992)
(holding that corporate director who buys or sells shares for personal owner-
ship owes no fiduciary duty to disclose information regarding the value of the
shares to other shareholders); Drapeau v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 670 A.2d
165, 172 & n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (concurring opinion) (stating that, under
Pennsylvania law, the purchase of shares by an officer or director from a
stockholder does not, in the absence of special circumstances, create a fiduci-
ary relationship between them).
140. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting majority rule cases
refuse to recognize an insider-shareholder fiduciary relationship).
141. See supra notes 36 (comparing state common law actions with Rule
10b-5 actions) and 37 (discussing growth of Rule 10b-5 actions).
142. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D. Del.
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but the federal courts eventually applied these fiduciary obli-
gations in other unconventional situations. For example, the
Chiarella Court acknowledged that the federal courts and the
SEC expanded § 10(b) fraud to cover insider stock sales to per-
sons buying into the corporation, despite the lack of a pre-
existing fiduciary relationship.14 3 The SEC also departed from
traditional state common law by imposing liability on insiders
who traded on open stock exchanges1 " where state courts had
been hesitant to impose such disclosure duties. 45 In most in-
stances, federal courts and the SEC readily looked to federal
policy to prohibit insiders from using inside information for
their own benefit, rather than strictly following the common
law. 14 6
2. Dirks v. SEC and the Personal Benefit Requirement
Dirks lays out the test for tipper/tippee insider trading li-
ability.147 The O'Hagan court failed to discuss Dirks and how it
broke from traditional state common law fiduciary principles
1951) (involving majority stockholder's failure to disclose facts in written offer
to purchase minority stockholders' shares); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (D. Pa. 1947).
143. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella's ap-
plication of § 10(b) to insider sales).
144. See supra note 43 (identifying Cady ruling extending liability to
transactions on open exchanges).
145. See supra note 34 (discussing common law cases dealing with stock
exchange transactions).
146. In Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the Commission noted:
[WMe have indicated that the purchase and sale of securities is a field in
special need of regulation for the protection of investors. To this end
one of the major purposes of the securities acts is the prevention of
fraud, manipulation or deception in connection with securities transac-
tions. Consistent with this objective, [§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5]... are
broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive
activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient
to sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit.
Id. at 910 (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 42-44 (quoting excerpts from
and discussing several SEC and circuit court § 10(b) decisions). In addition, al-
though it noted that "the common law in some jurisdictions imposes on
'corporate insiders'... an 'affirmative duty of disclosure ... when dealing in se-
curities,' " the Dirks Court ultimately held that breaches of this duty to share-
holders violated § 10(b) because it was the Exchange Aes purpose to "'eliminate
the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal
emolument of corporate office.'" Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646; 653 & n.10
(1983) (citation omitted).




by adding the personal benefit requirement for § 10(b) fraud. 48
The insider's intent to personally benefit is not an element for
fiduciary breach under state common law. 49 The requirement
is consistent, however, with federal policy aimed specifically at
prohibiting insider use of corporate information for self-
enrichment. 50
3. Post-Chiarella and Dirks Cases: More Unconventional
Fiduciary Obligations under § 10(b)
Corporate insiders owe no traditional common law fiduci-
ary duties to holders of stock options because the option hold-
ers' relationship with the corporation is strictly contractual. 151
Yet, the Chiarella Court cited approvingly to § 10(b) precedent
holding insiders liable for insider trading in options, again
suggesting that a broader federal policy supports Chiarella's
reasoning. 152 Many post-Chiarella holdings also applied § 10(b)
148. The § 10(b) benefit element limits liability to instances where insiders
divulge inside information for their own personal gain. See supra notes 28 &
61 and accompanying text (discussing Dirks benefit requirement). The Court
imposed this requirement largely to avoid an inhibiting effect on the activities
of market analysts. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 & nn.17-18. Where insiders re-
lease inside information to market analysts or reporters for valid corporate
purposes, there is no § 10(b) fiduciary breach. Id. The Court reasoned that, if
§ 10(b) prohibited analysts from obtaining inside information from corporate
insiders, it would ultimately hurt the investing public's ability to make in-
formed decisions about the value of stock. Id. at 658-59. The Court stated
specifically that imposing a duty to disclose would make it more difficult for
analysts to "ferret out" market information and disseminate that information
to the investing public either directly or through their clients. Id. Of course,
where insiders selectively disclose inside information to certain analysts to
enhance their reputation, they might be breaching a duty to their sharehold-
ers. Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary-The Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1273, 1293 (1984).
149. See Langevoort, supra note 148, at 1292 ("Miff there is one clear un-
derstanding in the common law of fiduciary responsibility, it is that an intent
to benefit is not a necessary element.").
150. The Dirks Court noted that:
Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large
part on the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws
was to eliminate "use of inside information for personal advantage."
Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly
or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (citation omitted).
151. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (holding that
officers of corporation owe no fiduciary duties to holders of convertible deben-
tures, and reasoning that "a mere expectancy interest does not create a fidu-
ciary relationship").
152. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (noting that fed-
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to reach insider trading in options." 3 Courts did not have long
to test the applicability of the fiduciary theory of insider trad-
ing liability to options trading, however, because the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 made the jurisprudence of in-
sider trading applicable to options. 54
A fragmentary body of post-Chiarella and Dirks case law
has also allowed bondholder § 10(b) challenges for fiduciary
breach against insiders who traded in debt securities while
possessing inside information.15  There has been considerable
controversy about the SEC's and private plaintiffs' ability to
bring insider trading actions involving bonds. 156  Generally,
under state law, insiders do not owe bondholders, even those
with convertible bonds, any fiduciary duties.5 7
eral courts found § 10(b) violations where insiders used inside information for
their own benefit, and citing Texas Gulf). In Texas Gulf, several defendants
either personally purchased call options or divulged information to others for
use in purchasing call options. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
839-41 (2d Cir. 1968).
153. See, e.g., Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 163-64
(N.D. 111 1985) (holding option traders had standing to sue insider traders and
stating that insiders' duties ran "not only to the shareholders of the corporate
employer, but also to the investing public at large"); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that
option holders had standing to sue insiders and their tippees who traded in
options based on inside information). Where option holder plaintiffs did not
trade directly or contemporaneously with the insider traders, courts have
been unwilling to impose liability. See, e.g., Laventhall v. General Dynamics
Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that option holder plaintiff
had no cause of action against corporation that purchased its own shares
without disclosing cash dividend where plaintiff failed to show that he con-
temporaneously traded in the same market); Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp.,
668 F. Supp. 358, 364 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that purchaser of call options
lacked standing to sue corporation where no insider traded in corporation's
options or stock).
154. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1994)).
155. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 680 F.2d
933, 941 (3d Cir.) (holding that securities holders with equity options are en-
titled to fiduciary obligations from issuers and insiders), cert. denied., 459
U.S. 1056 (1982); SEC v. Karcher, Litigation Release No. 11,702, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,709, at 98,284 (Apr. 14, 1988)
(ruling that restaurant executive violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he sold
his company's debentures before disclosing negative earnings).
156. See, e.g., R. Ren6 Pengra, Insider Trading, Debt Securities, and Rule
10b-5: Evaluating the Fiduciary Relationship, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1354, 1355
(1992) (noting disagreement among commentators regarding applicability of
federal insider trading laws to debt securities).
157. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986)
("Under our law-and the law generally-the relationship between a corpora-




For the most part, however, the current state of insider
trading jurisprudence in bonds is consistent with federal pol-
icy, rather than common law fiduciary principles. Where cor-
porations issue or repurchase their debt securities without
disclosing inside information, most § 10(b) precedent seems to
favor no § 10(b) liability."8 According to Dirks, this result is
justified because the primary purpose of the transaction was
not to benefit the insider personally, but to benefit the issuing
corporation and its shareholders. 5 9 Recognition of a duty to
disclose to the bondholders in this instance, moreover, would
conflict with the insiders' duties to act in the shareholders' best
interests.
When insiders engage in insider trading in debt securities
for their personal benefit or divulge inside information to close
associates, however, they are not redistributing value from the
bondholders to the corporation; they are redistributing value to
themselves. Recognizing a duty in this instance would not
conflict with that owed to shareholders, and it meets the Dirks
personal benefit requirement. Although few cases involve facts
where insiders traded in bonds for self-enrichment or divulged
inside information to outsiders, 6 ' at least one case suggests
that courts might find § 10(b) liability where elements of self-
enrichment are involved.' 6' Additionally, Chiarella's fiduciary
158. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell ni'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 958 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (holding that issuer owed no disclosure duties to debenture
holders in cash-out merger because debenture holders received only that to
which they were contractually entitled under the indenture); Lorenz v. CSX
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 650, 659 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (dismissing debenture holders'
claim against issuer for failing to disclose stock dividend and holding that re-
lationship between corporation and bondholders was strictly contractual in
nature).
159. For example, where a corporation buys back securities at a depressed
price immediately prior to the announcement of good news relating to the
condition of the corporation, the shareholders benefit because value is appro-
priated from the bondholders to the corporation.
160. This is explainable in part because bonds have fixed obligations whose
market prices do not fluctuate as sharply as stocks, thereby reducing the op-
portunity for exploitation by insider trading. Thomas A. McGrath III, Note,
The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of Information-Based Insider Trading Enforce-
ment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S127, S146 (1993). In recent years, however, in-
sider trading in more volatile junk bonds has increased. Id.
161. In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, No. C 87 5491 SC [1990-
1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,689, at 98,239 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 1990) (granting debenture holders standing to sue insiders and their
tippees individually on grounds that "insiders have a 'fiduciary duty' to deben-
ture purchasers, and the Defendants as tippees can be liable to the Debenture
Subclass for trading on the basis of a tip that violated the tippers' fiduciary
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theory of § 10(b) liability has had less opportunity to develop in
the context of debt securities because the SEC continues to file
charges in such cases under the misappropriation theory. 162
While perhaps not all the decisions finding § 10(b) insider
trading liability fit squarely within this self-enrichment theo-
retical justification,163 the above-cited instances demonstrate
that the federal courts have clearly abandoned strict common
law fiduciary principles. In developing a broader framework
for fiduciary obligations under the federal security laws, the
federal courts appear to have been driven somewhat by per-
ceived notions of unfairness in allowing insiders to use their
unique position of access to corporate information for personal
benefit. Admittedly, this justification supports imposing § 10(b)
disclosure duties on insiders when they trade on the basis of
tender offer information because such trading also involves
abuses of the insider position. If Chiarella's special "re-
lationship" requirement is to mean anything, however, it must
at least limit § 10(b) disclosure protections to those investors
who have or will have an interest in the insider's corporation
specifically.
duty"). The court also noted that bondholders are "justified in presuming that
corporate insiders are not abusing their position by profiting from undisclosed
corporate information." Id. Because the defendants only traded in stock, and
never bought or sold debt securities, the court's holding is contrary to those
which require claimants to have traded directly or contemporaneously with
the insider traders. Id. at 98,238-39; see also supra note 153 (discussing op-
tion contract cases lacking transactional nexus).
162. See, e.g., SEC v. Cooper Cos., 52 SEC Docket 2439, No. 92-8166 (JFK),
1992 WL 345225 (SEC) (Nov. 10, 1992) (announcing SEC charges against per-
sons who traded in junk bonds based on tips from insider analyst); SEC v.
Morse, 51 SEC Docket 1285, No. 92-64, 1992 WL 151070 (SEC) (June 24,
1992) (announcing that officer of governmental corporation consented to
stipulation ordering disgorgement of profits from his purchase of municipal
bonds while in possession of inside information).
163. Many courts fail to make a distinction between the situation in which
the issuer of corporate bonds sells or purchases its bonds with inside infor-
mation and the situation in which insiders trade for personal self-interest or
tip associates. See supra note 155 (discussing cases imposing § 10(b) liability
on bond issuers); see also Broad v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 429-30(5th Cir. 1980) (utilizing common law contract principles to impose a good




IV. A NEW MODEL FOR § 14(e) INSIDER TRADING
LIABILITY
A. INSIDER TRADING DURING TENDER OFFERS AND THE NEW§ 14(e) DUTY TO TARGET COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS
The O'Hagan court should have interpreted § 14(e) fraud
to create a quasi-fiduciary duty between insiders and target
company stockholders. The rationale for imposing the duty is
similar to that for § 10(b): insiders are in a position of access to
their company's tender offer plans, and it would be unfair to al-
low them to use this access for self-enrichment. Whereas § 10(b)
expresses a federal interest in regulating disclosure in an in-
tra-corporate context, however, § 14(e)'s zone of interest is in
regulating disclosure between tender offer bidders and target
company shareholders." Consistent with federal policy against
insider use of corporate information for self-enrichment, insid-
ers involved in tender offers come under a § 14(e) duty to place
the welfare of the bidder and target company shareholders be-
fore their own. Insiders who fail to disclose inside tender offer
information before purchasing target company stock for self-
gain would breach a duty to disclose to target shareholders
who sell their shares. Moreover, insiders could not tip outsid-
ers for the purpose of trading in the target's stock where the tip
is intended to be self-serving.1 65
Insiders often tip institutional investors in advance of
their companies' plans to make a tender offer with the expec-
tation that the institutions will buy large amounts of the tar-
gets' stocks at the pre-offer price and then offer their shares to
the tendering corporations when the tender offers are an-
nounced.166 This practice, which is commonly called "ware-
housing," facilitates takeovers by enabling tender offerors to
acquire target stock at a lower price than if they purchased all
164. Although § 14(e) does not expressly prohibit insider trading, the Wil-
liams Act generally expresses an interest in regulating disclosure of informa-
tion by tender offerors to target companies and imposes numerous duties on
tender offerors vis-A-vis target company shareholders. See supra notes 75 &
132 (discussing William's Act's provisions and legislative history). Despite the
absence of statutory language addressing the matter, moreover, courts have
applied § 10(b) fraud to prohibit insider trading. Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). It would not be a gross misreading of § 14(e) fraud,
therefore, to find that it applies to insider trading in a tender offer context.
165. Cf Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (introducing the personal
benefit and scienter elements).
166. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234.
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the target shares at tender offer prices. If the disclosure was
intended to benefit the bidding corporation only, and not the
insiders personally, neither the insiders nor the tippees should
be liable. 167 As the Dirks Court stated, "Absent some personal
gain, there has been no breach of duty ... "168
Where insiders trade for self-enrichment, as in O'Hagan,
§ 14(e) liability would apply.1 69 Although O'Hagan was not an
officer of Grand Metropolitan, the Dirks Court recognized that
attorneys working closely with corporations become insiders to
the corporation itself.170 Even if O'Hagan was not sufficiently
involved with the tender offer to become an insider of Grand
Metropolitan, he could still face derivative liability as a tip-
pee.171 As an insider or tippee, O'Hagan owed Pillsbury Com-
pany's shareholders a duty not to trade in Pillsbury Company
shares without disclosing inside tender offer information. Be-
cause the SEC never submitted charges to the jury based on a
theory of § 14(e) liability like the one proposed here, the
Eighth Circuit's reversal of O'Hagan's conviction should stand.
167. The tender offer bidder and a warehousing institution may act as a
'group" in acquiring securities of the issuer and, therefore, violate § 13(d) of
the Williams Act by failing to file a report when the group's holdings reach
five percent. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
168. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
169. It is conceivable that § 14(e) could allow target company shareholders,
in addition to the SEC, a private right of action to recover profits from the
bidder's insiders. Courts have in certain instances limited § 14(e) private
rights of action. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42
(1977) (finding no private right of action for defeated tender offeror). They
have been virtually uniform, however, in granting target companies standing
to sue bidders. See, e.g., Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d
1513, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that target corporation had § 14(e) pri-
vate right of action to seek corrective disclosures from tender offeror); Ameri-
can Carriers, Inc. v. Baytree Investors, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 800, 808 (D. Kan.
1988) (recognizing plaintiffs standing to bring § 14(e) injunctive action
against tender offeror); cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42
n.28 (1977) (reserving the question).
170. See supra note 24 (noting the types of individuals who may be corpo-
rate insiders under Dirks). Grand Metropolitan retained Dorsey & Whitney
in July 1988, as local counsel in its hostile takeover of Pillsbury Company.
After initially accepting the assignment, Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from
representing Grand Metropolitan in September 1988, following a debate
within the firm over the merits of representing a foreign company in a hostile
takeover of a local company. David Phelps, O'Hagan Guilty of Insider Trad-
ing in Pillsbury Buyout, STAR TRIB., Feb. 11, 1994, at Al.
171. The SEC's complaint alleged that O'Hagan learned of the hostile
takeover from another Dorsey & Whitney law partner who represented Grand




In the future, however, insiders like O'Hagan would fall within
the scope of this rule.
Under this expanded construction of § 14(e) fraud, it is still
questionable whether Rule 14e-3 is a valid exercise of § 14(e)
authority. A literal reading of Rule 14e-3 would impose a duty
to disclose on all persons with tender offer information, not just
on insiders involved in the making of the tender offer.172
Moreover, it is apparent from the rule's administrative history
that the SEC contemplated that the rule would prohibit ware-
housing, which lacks the Dirks insider self-benefit element.173
If Rule 14e-3 is not salvageable, insiders can still violate § 14(e)
in the rule's absence because, unlike § 10(b), § 14(e) expressly
prohibits fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive conduct in
connection with a tender offer.1
7 4
B. A MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY UNDER § 14(e)?
The administrative history accompanying Rule 14e-3 also
suggests the SEC viewed breaches of fiduciary duty under the
misappropriation theory as providing one basis for the rule's
validity.75 By prematurely striking down Rule 14e-3, the
Eighth Circuit missed the opportunity to analyze the validity
of the misappropriation theory under § 14(e).
Section 14(e) merely requires that fraud occur "in connec-
tion with any tender offer," 176 so it would not be a gross mis-
reading to find that misappropriation of information relating to
a tender offer in breach of a fiduciary duty is "in connection
with" the tender offer. However, although this reasonably lib-
eral construction of § 14(e) might accommodate the misappro-
priation theory, the theory runs into the same difficulties as
172. See supra note 8 (quoting Rule 14e-3). The rule also emphasizes that
the tippee need only have a "reason to know" state of mind. This does not ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the Dirks scienter element because the Dirks
Court stated that tippees need only know, or have reason to know, of the in-
sider's breach to satisfy the fiduciary breach element. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
173. See 1 SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64,
pt. 1, at xxxii (1971) (discussing possibility of developing new rule to prohibit
warehousing).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
175. In discussing its authority to adopt the rule in the face of the Chi-
arella holding, the Commission noted that "the Chiarella Court did not re-
solve whether trading while in possession of material, nonpublic market in-
formation misappropriated or obtained or used by unlawful means violates
Rule 10b-5." Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6239, 34-17120, IC-11336, 45 Fed.
Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (1980).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
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the equal-access-to-information theory'77 by pushing the scope
of § 14(e) beyond regulating the relationship between the ten-
der offeror and target company shareholders.' Anyone who
acquired tender offer information through a relationship of
trust and confidence would come under the scope of the the-
ory.'79 The focus of the misappropriation theory, moreover, is
on the defrauded corporate source of the information. 180 The
corporation always retains discretion to authorize its insiders
to trade on inside information, possibly leaving target company
shareholders with no disclosure protections at all. A sounder
policy would simply recognize that the insider owes a § 14(e)
duty to target company shareholders, the persons with whom
the insider traded. This rationale fits more comfortably within
the securities laws' goal of investor protection and would leave
the door open for courts to imply a § 14(e) private cause of ac-
tion for target shareholders.'81
CONCLUSION
The huge number of tender offers, mergers, and leveraged
buyouts in recent years has contributed to increased securities
trading on inside information about possible takeover bids. In
response, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 specifically to curb
insider trading in this area. In United States v. O'Hagan, the
Eighth Circuit became the first circuit to invalidate Rule 14e-3.
Basing its decision on common law principles and past inter-
pretations of § 10(b), the court concluded that the rule was an
impermissible exercise of the SEC's authority to prohibit § 14(e)
fraudulent conduct because the rule lacked a breach of fiduci-
ary requirement.
Although Rule 14e-3 exceeds its statutory mandate, the
Eighth Circuit ultimately misinterpreted the SEC's authority to
prohibit fraud under § 14(e). In particular, the court improperly
incorporated common law fiduciary principles into § 14(e) fraud
177. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing Texas Gulf
and its reading of the Exchange Act to promote equal access to information).
178. See supra Part II.A (arguing that § 14(e) at best regulates disclosure
between insiders of tender offer bidders and target company shareholders).
179. See supra note 73 (discussing cases involving misappropriation the-
ory).
180. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text (discussing misappro-
priation theory).
181. See supra note 169 (discussing cases that have granted a private right
of action under § 14(e)).
[Vol. 81:10151046
1997] INSIDER TRADING 1047
when it should have looked to federal policy prohibiting insid-
ers from using inside information for self-enrichment. This ap-
proach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent interpret-
ing similar anti-fraud provisions in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
This Comment proposes a new model of § 14(e) insider trading
liability which would recognize that insiders to tender offers
owe disclosure duties to target company shareholders. Recog-
nition of such a duty would further the federal securities laws'
general goal of investor protection and would compel insiders
who trade on possible takeover bids to "make their money the
old fashion way"- earn it.
1)
